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This article examines Caryl Phillips’s A Distant Shore (2003) in light of his claim that, in 
‘the new world order’ consideration must be afforded to ‘the dignity which informs the 
limited participation of the migrant, the asylum seeker, or the refugee’. Dignity here 
relates to the ambivalence that surrounds the question of belonging, and, after Emmanuel 
Levinas, of accepting responsibility for the Other; both in terms of the resistance to 
otherness implied by maintaining a dignified appearance, or saving face, and the dignity 
conferred by the acceptance of ‘the Other as the neighbour’. After Giorgio Agamben, I 
take ‘the camp’ as a motif in Phillips’s novel, both of a space where dignity is utterly 
denied, and of Europe’s racially-formulated practices of exclusion. I read the actual and 
deterritorialized presence of the camp as signifying a limit, commensurate with Phillips’s 
sense of the limitations on the refugee’s participation in the new world order, and 
Agamben’s assertion that the refugee is a limit on the concept of citizenship, in order to 
examine what limits dignity, and places dignity at the limits. 
 
Keywords: Caryl Phillips; Giorgio Agamben; Levinas; refugees; the camp; dignity; 
biopolitics; homo sacer; non-place. 
 
 
In the titular essay of his most recent collection of non-fiction, A New World Order 
(2001), Caryl Phillips concludes with the following statement: 
The old static order, in which one people speaks down to another, lesser, people is 
dead. The colonial, or postcolonial, model has collapsed. In its place we have a new 
world order in which there will be one global conversation with limited participation 
open to all, and full participation available to none. In this new world nobody will 
feel fully at home. […] In this new world order of the twenty-first century we are all 
being dealt an ambiguous hand, one which may eventually help us to accept the 
dignity which informs the limited participation of the migrant, the asylum seeker, or 
the refugee (5-6). 
 
Phillips’s claim anticipates and attests to a democratisation of discourse, in which no 
participant(s) will be able to claim dominance. This new world order represents the 
opening up of formerly closed conversations about power and control, disposing of 
the old Eurocentric model in favour of a world ordered around movement, in constant 
(and productive) flux—where “nobody will feel fully at home”. In spite of these large 
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claims, however, Phillips does not over-reach in his assessment of the condition of the 
migrant. His assertion that in the twenty-first century everyone will be dealt an 
ambiguous hand does not homogenise; while he looks forward to a better appreciation 
of “the dignity which informs the limited participation of the migrant” in the global 
conversation, he does not suggest that what actually imposes these limits is the same 
in every case. In a fluid world order, it will likely remain the case that some will feel 
more at home than others.  
The purpose of this essay is to investigate Phillips’s claim in light of his novel 
A Distant Shore (2003), in which he addresses the issues of dignity and its limitations 
through the relationship between Dorothy, a retired teacher of music who is suffering 
a breakdown, and her neighbour Solomon, an African living clandestinelyi in 
England. Please note that, to avoid continually making a cumbersome distinction 
between Solomon/Gabriel, I will simply use the name that is appropriate to the point 
in the novel under discussion. Both characters feel a sense of alienation in Weston, the 
small Northern village to which they are both recently arrived. The fact that each is 
also preoccupied by a sense of personal dignity and the limitations imposed upon this 
by their experiences as alien, provokes some important questions; about the extent to 
which dignity (or its absence) informs the participation of the migrant in the new 
world order Phillips describes; and about what limits this participation (and therefore 
limits dignity/places dignity at the limits)?  
Issues of place and dignity linked in the novel by a mutually ambivalent 
relationship with the question of what it means to belong; as is clear from its opening 
lines, A Distant Shore is a novel in which sense of place is a central theme: “England 
has changed. These days it’s difficult to tell who’s from around here and who’s not. 
Who belongs and who’s a stranger” (3). The issue of who belongs is complicated by 
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the suggestion that England has changed, and the corresponding ambivalence 
surrounding the distinction between stranger and resident. Dignity in Phillips’s novel 
covers a spectrum of behaviour, from simple decorum to instances of 
(de)humanization; yet a constant feature is that assertions of dignity represent the 
recognition of the presence of the outsider within a place that has become host to “the 
limited participation of the migrant” (A New World Order: 6); whereas the denial of 
dignity is the articulation of that limit.  
Weston is described as a village struggling to define itself; while the residents 
are able to refer to their recent efforts to protect their identity by resisting “a move to 
change the name of Weston to Market Weston” (3), it remains a “village […] divided 
into two” (4); both because of the poorly integrated new housing development, 
Stoneleigh, and also it’s divided sense of itself—Dorothy remarks that “[t]he only 
history around these parts is probably the architecture. The terraces on both sides of 
the main road are typical miners’ houses […]. However, these houses have all long 
since been replumbed, and the muck has been blasted off the faces of most of them so 
that they now look almost quaint” (4). This detachment from its heritage is 
compounded by Weston’s sense of inadequacy, in contrast with the “the German town 
[…] bombed flat by the RAF, and the French village […where] Jews […] were all 
rounded up and sent to the camps” (4) with which it is twinned; “I can’t help feeling 
that it makes Weston seem a bit tame by comparison” (4). Combined with these 
disaffections, the changes that make it “difficult to tell who’s from around here and 
who’s not” identify Weston as suffering a clear case of what Paul Gilroy has called 
“post-imperial melancholia”, a syndrome he defines as rooted in the nation’s inability, 
“to face, never mind actually mourn, the profound changes in circumstances and 
mood that followed the end of Empire and consequent loss of imperial prestige” (98). 
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Such a condition results in a preoccupation with “even a partial restoration of the 
country’s long-vanished homogeneity” (95). As the references to German and French 
towns whose identity is marked by their war experiences demonstrate, England’s 
post-war decline is intimately associated with the disorientation of incursive cultural 
heterogeneity, and consequent longing for the past; Gilroy notes that continual 
references to the anti-Nazi conflict illustrate,  
how the nation remade itself through war and victory but can be also understood as a 
rejection or deferral of its present problems. […] Neither the appeal of homogeneity 
nor the antipathy toward immigrants and strangers who represent the involution of 
national culture can be separated from [the] underlying hunger for reorientation. 
Turning back in this direction is also a turning away from the perceived dangers of 
pluralism and from the irreversible fact of multiculture (97). 
 
As a relic of the old static order Phillips dismissed in his essay, Weston is indicative 
of at least some of the factors that place limits on the participation of the post-colonial 
migrant in the new world order. As Gilroy observes, “grudging recognition” that 
“[t]he immigrant is now here because Britain, Europe, was once out there” has 
inflicted a burden of definition upon the postcolonial migrant; “today’s unwanted 
settlers carry all the ambivalence of empire with them” (110). 
As Bénédicte Ledent has said, in Phillips’s work, locations “derive their 
significance from their being suggestive of the character’s experience” (150). In light 
of this, the reference to “the French village [where] Jews were all rounded up and sent 
to the camps” is also important; ‘the camp’ operates as a motif in A Distant Shore, of 
a space where dignity (recognition of humanity) is utterly denied. Phillips has written 
of the Nazi concentration camps before, most notably in Higher Ground (1988) and 
The Nature of Blood (1997), as a signifier of racially formulated exclusion in Europe. 
In fact, in The European Tribe (1987) Phillips acknowledges the formative role that 
awareness of the camp played in the realisation of both his place in Europe, and his 
 4
vocation. Describing the experience, as a teenager, of watching a documentary on the 
Nazi occupation of Holland, he recalls, 
I watched the library footage of the camps and realized both the enormity of the 
crime that was being perpetrated, and the precariousness of my own position in 
Europe. The many adolescent thoughts that worried my head can be reduced to one 
line: ‘If white people could do that to white people, then what the hell would they do 
to me?’ (66-67). 
 
Phillips’s sense of the camp as a pervasive influence, signifying the limits of 
belonging in Europe, corresponds with Giorgio Agamben’s sense that the camp is not 
a location or a concept confined to its historical use; rather it is, as Agamben 
formulates in Homo Sacer (1998) and Remnants of Auschwitz (1999),  the ultimate 
expression of biopolitical space.  
Biopolitics refers to the manner in which biological life is appropriated as a 
means of legitimising state power. As nations define themselves by birth, anyone born 
into a nation ceases to simply be, to have a bare natural life, but rather they are 
transformed into citizens—that is, bodies invested with the right to belong. Taking 
this as his starting point, Agamben argues that refugees are threatening because they 
“break the continuity between man and citizen, nativity and nationality” (Homo 
Sacer: 131), and therefore introduce crisis into the formulation of the nation. The 
refugee represents a body not invested with any rights to belong, but whose presence 
threatens the link between nativity and nationality that is the foundation of the nation: 
“The refugee must be considered for what he is: nothing less than a limit concept that 
radically calls into question the fundamental categories of the nation-state, from the 
birth-nation to the man-citizen link” (134). The body of the refugee threatens the way 
nations see and construct themselves. But it is also true that because the refugee body 
is not invested with the right to belong and made then into a signifier of the ‘nation’, 
that they are made vulnerable. In this dynamic of nativity and nationality, the non-
citizen refugee remains as an example of bare life, that is life at the extremity, at the 
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limits, the most basic expression of humanity; and which must be relegated to the 
limits of the nation—the camp. 
The ‘camp’ and the ‘refugee’ both represent a kind of limit-concept; both 
Phillips and Agambenii express a sense of the camp as signifying a limit—the limit—
commensurate with Phillips’s sense of the limitations placed on the migrant’s 
participation in the new world order and Agamben’s assertion that the refugee is a 
limit on the concept of citizenship. This convergence presents the camp as a 
deterritorialized force of exclusion, in which the refugee within the space of the nation 
nonetheless signifies its limits; this is the burden of definition imposed on the 
postcolonial migrant: that they are made the incarnation of a deterritorialized border. 
The emergence and influence of the camp as the materialisation of a condition of bare 
life represents therefore, in A Distant Shore, both the factor that limits dignity and 
also the limit at which the presence of dignity is accepted. Catherine Mills has said 
that Agamben’s theorization of the camp is the starting point of a reconsideration of 
ethics “sought in a terrain before judgement, a terrain in which the conditions of 
judgement are suspended through the indistinction of the human and the inhuman” 
(np). In a moment strongly reminiscent of Levinas’s insistent remark that “the other is 
the neighbour” (“Ethics and Politics”: 294), Solomon introduces himself to Dorothy, 
in their first meeting, as her neighbour (56). Building on the Levinasian sense of an 
ethics before judgement, this article will also ask one final question of Phillips’s 
novel, which consolidates the link between place, belonging and dignity; to what 
extent does their shared sense of dignity make possible a realisation of the humanity 





The first section of A Distant Shore describes, in Phillips’s words, a “cautious 
friendship […] forged by degrees; painful degrees” (Dublin Quarterly, np), and what 
marks each guarded move closer towards each other is Dorothy and Solomon’s shared 
preoccupation with the preservation of dignity in the face of rejection. There is a 
crucial difference, however, in the way they interpret dignity. When he arrives in 
England for the first time, literally washed up on the south coast after crossing the 
Channel hanging from the side of a ship, Gabriel’s first thought is “that there is no 
dignity to his predicament” (149). Dignity is equated with the acknowledgement of 
his humanity; its absence, in the face of the most extreme deprivation or rejection, 
demonstrates the dehumanising conditions to which many irregular migrants are 
subjected. However, for Dorothy, dignity is more a matter of saving face; her 
relationships with three men in the novel—Brian, her estranged husband; and 
Mahmood and Geoff, both married men with whom she has affairs—each carry a 
common theme: “Her story contains the single word, abandonment” (203). Yet, in 
particular, her persistent efforts to maintain a dignified façade despite the diminishing 
of her relationship with Mahmood demonstrate her preoccupation with appearances: 
“She is relieved that he still seems amenable to eating first, for to dispense with the 
etiquette of the shared meal would be to abandon dignity. However, ‘dignity’ is a 
word that Mahmood seems to be increasingly unfamiliar with” (198). The latter 
sentence, qualifying the notion that each party is complicit in the preservation of 
dignity, reveals an undercurrent of racial prejudice in Dorothy; the relaxation of his 
eating habits contradict her notion of proper behaviour and make the illusion of a 
romantic tryst harder to maintain, but carry also a disquieted sense of cultural 
difference that is reminiscent of Gilroy’s post-imperial melancholia: “These days he 
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eats quickly, often with one hand (always his right hand), and he makes noises that 
alarm her” (198).  
 In addition, Mahmood’s noisy openness about bodily functions—Dorothy is 
also alarmed when “she hears the undignified thunder of urine cascading directly into 
the water and not against the side of the bowl” (210)—suggest to her a lack of self-
control. By contrast, what first suggests to Dorothy an affinity with Solomon is his 
evident self-containment: 
His car is parked out front in its proper place. It’s clearly second-hand, but it’s 
always carefully washed and clean. The other day I saw him take a cloth to it and go 
at the body-work as though he was buffing up a piece of brass. I’ve thought about 
asking him why he takes so much trouble over a car, but there’s no point because it 
fits in with how he behaves about everything. The way he dresses, or cuts the lawn, 
or combs his hair with that sharp razor parting. Everything is done with such 
precision. Like most folks up here, he keeps himself to himself, but unlike most of 
the folks up here, he lives by himself. Like me, he’s a lone bird (14). 
 
Solomon’s precise, meticulous nature and his evident strangeness combine to make 
him an unlikely ally for Dorothy as she pursues her own path apart from the general 
population of Weston; both are “the sort of person people in Weston feel comfortable 
talking about” (38, 40). This apparent shared concern for appearances signifies a shift 
in the definition of dignity as a matter of decorum, and demonstrates one of the ways 
in which dignity occupies a limit and place of tension in the novel. Whereas 
Solomon’s dignified carriage of his otherness resonates with Dorothy’s own sense of 
estrangement, his behaviour, according to standards Dorothy admits are from an 
earlier era, also acts as a kind of limit on his otherness. It is a performance of what is 
familiar and reassuring, at least partially obscuring Solomon’s unsettling difference. 
This is evident in her intolerance for the homeless who “plague the town”. Whereas 
Solomon’s strangeness is contained by his attention to appearances, the undignified 
appearance of the destitute (“with their matted hair and their bottles of meths” (12) 
bears inescapable witness to their alienation, a kind of naked otherness that is far 
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more disturbing for Dorothy, who always puts on her “day face” (312), than 
Solomon’s.  
 However, as I have indicated, dignity occupies a place of limit in the novel in 
terms of demarcating a boundary, but also in terms of something incomplete or 
partial. It is therefore significant that Solomon’s precise care for his car only partially 
obscures his otherness: 
There is, of course, one thing that I’ve been meaning to tell him, but I haven’t found 
the right opportunity. It’s about all this washing of his car. I want to tell him that in 
England you have to become a part of the neighbourhood. Say hello to people. Go to 
church. Introduce your kids to their new school. You can’t just turn up and start 
washing your car. People will consider you to be ignorant and stand-offish. But I’ve 
yet to find the proper moment to talk to Solomon about the way he flaunts himself in 
his driveway with that bucket of soapy water and his shammy (16). 
 
While it marks him out as inhabiting an era of dignified behaviour whose passing 
Dorothy regrets because Solomon is a “proper gentleman” (64), Solomon’s car 
washing also marks his otherness. In performing this act, he makes himself stand 
apart from the population of Stoneleigh, and Weston—it is also a sign of his 
difference. In this sense, the act of washing the car is an expression of the “dignity of 
the limited participation of the migrant” (A New World Order: 6), whose otherness is 
made to attend upon the maintenance of his dignity. Therefore dignity occupies both a 
limit and a place of tension in A Distant Shore, signifying both the presence and 
proximity of the Other.  
 The proximity of the Other is a central tenet of Levinas's ethical thinking, 
entailing an ethical position which puts first an eradicable responsibility towards the 
Other: “The Other becomes my neighbour precisely through the way the face 
summons me, calls for me, begs for me, and in so doing recalls my responsibility and 
calls me into question” (“Ethics as First Philosophy”: 83). Levinas's concept of the 
'face' is central to his ethical position; it signifies a point of exteriority, exceeding the 
self, encountered in the presence of the Other. It has a defining relation with Levinas’s 
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notion of proximity, and responsibility. For Levinas, “the proximity of the other is the 
face’s meaning” (82); and this proximity is crucially anachronous: “The relationship 
of proximity cannot be reduced to any modality of distance or geometrical contiguity, 
nor to the simple ‘representation’ of a neighbour; it is already an assignation, an 
extremely urgent assignation—an obligation, anachronously prior to any 
commitment” (“Substitution”: 90). As such, proximity is intimately bound up in an 
inextricable responsibility for the other that occupies a conceptual “terrain before 
judgement” (Mills, np). By contrast, Dorothy’s habit of applying her ‘day face’ (312), 
rather than making proximity possible, imposes distance. 
This notion of 'face' is especially helpful in reading a particular encounter 
between Dorothy and Solomon. As she enters the cul-de-sac in which they both live, 
having missed her bus, Solomon expresses concern for her welfare couched in 
sympathetic terms: 
'Miss Jones, it is true that sometimes life can be difficult, yes?' He turns to face me. 
The dying sun forms a halo around his head and for a moment I find myself more 
caught up with this image than with his enquiry. Solomon notices that my mind has 
drifted off, but he simply waits until my mind returns (32). 
 
As Bernard Waldenfells has observed: 
Levinas's reflections on the proximity and remoteness of the other's face are focussed 
on the crucial motif of trace. The trace 'shines (luit) as the face of the other'. [...] The 
trace of the infinite which 'shines' as the face of the other shows the ambiguous 
feature of somebody before whom (or to whom) and for whom I am responsible (77-
78).iii  
 
Solomon's face, as that of the Other turned towards Dorothy, presents her with a trace 
which identifies him as the neighbour, for whom she shares a responsibility just as he 
expresses his responsibility in his concern for her welfare. His exteriority, 'face', or 
otherness, are a challenge to Dorothy to go beyond her own alienation, her ‘day face’, 
something she makes clearest strides towards doing in the way she responds to his 
murder. But while the ambiguity of the face of the other is not resolved as it is turned 
towards Dorothy, the nature of her responsibility (in Levinasian terms) is forthright 
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and clear. Levinas defines this responsibility as, 
A responsibility that goes beyond what I may or may not have done to the Other or 
whatever acts I may or may not have committed, as if I were devoted to the other 
man before being devoted to myself. Or more exactly, as if I had to answer for the 
other's death even before being. A guiltless responsibility, whereby I am nonetheless 
open to an accusation of which no alibi spatial or temporal could clear me (“Ethics as 
First Philosophy”: 83). 
 
Similarly, in Phillips's novel the face of the Other is insistent; Dorothy invites 
Solomon to her house for a cup of tea: “As I turn to walk towards my house, the full 
glare of the dying sun hits me in the face. Solomon has been blocking out much of its 
force, but I now squeeze my eyes closed against its powerful light” (33). The trace 
shining in the face of the Other is unavoidable, even more so when that face has 
turned away again—as an eradicable memory, as it were.  
 However, significantly, Levinas is not describing a responsibility in which 
blame is apportioned; rather, it is a guiltless (if absolute) responsibility. As Simon 
Critchley has said, Levinasian ethics “is my experience of a demand that I both cannot 
fully meet and cannot avoid” (22). Thus, Dorothy's partial (and delayed) acceptance 
of this responsibility must be understood as an inevitable limitation. Initially, having 
allowed herself to get close to Solomon, she turns away from him. When he reveals 
he has been receiving abusive letters from people in the village she expresses a 
nascent responsibility: “I feel embarrassed, as though I am somehow responsible for 
these people, whoever they are” (40). As if to confirm the complicity of their 
relationship Solomon also expresses a corresponding sense of responsibility: 
“Sometimes the behaviour of my fellow human beings makes me ashamed” (43). Yet 
the result of this exchange is that Dorothy moves away from any intimate proximity 
with Solomon: “I don't want Solomon to become a problem in my life, but today I get 
the feeling that this is what he's becoming and it's making me feel awkward” (45). She 
resolves to restore the distance between them by going away for a night. When she 
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returns Solomon has been murdered by a racist gang.  
The circumstances of Solomon’s death identify him as an example of the 
homo sacer, “who may be killed and yet not sacrificed”, as defined by Agamben 
(Homo Sacer: 8):  
What defines the homo sacer is […] both the particular character of the double 
exclusion into which he is taken and the violence to which he finds himself exposed. 
This violence—the unsanctionable killing that, in his case, anyone may commit—is 
classifiable neither as sacrifice nor as homicide, neither as the execution of a 
condemnation to death nor as sacrilege. (82) 
 
The homo sacer represents the materialisation of bare life, subject to a delocalised (an 
act that “anyone may commit”) sovereign will. Following Carl Schmitt, whose 
Political Theology (1922) defined the state of exception, Agamben regards this will as 
determining who is included and who is excluded from the definition of humanity. 
The carelessness that surrounds Solomon’s death—Dorothy notes, “My friend was 
found face down in a canal and nobody seems to care” (47)—illustrate how dignity 
has been stripped from him in death. Dorothy's response to this, while symptomatic of 
her strained emotional state and ultimately leading to her complete breakdown, also 
indicates at least a partial acceptance (poised between proximity and distance) of her 
guiltless responsibility for the Other in death. As Levinas has said, “The other man’s 
death calls me into question, as if, by my possible future indifference, I had become 
the accomplice of the death to which the other […] is exposed” (“Ethics as First 
Philosophy”: 83). She takes one of the abusive letters and pins it to the notice board of 
the local pub, noting with satisfaction that she has “‘mailed’ it back to them” (63). As 
she returns to Stoneleigh, she notices the grimy condition of Solomon’s car, and 
observes that “Solomon would never have let it deteriorate into such a state” (63). Her 
gesture of cleaning his car represents her efforts to restore dignity to the homo sacer, 
and also an expression of sympathy with the otherness (and consequently his bare 
life) that his repetitive washing of the car represented. Unknown to Dorothy, 
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Solomon’s care for his vehicle is a form of memorialising of Mike, the former owner 
who showed Solomon hospitality during his first months in England. Her gesture 
therefore establishes her as part of a chain of gestures that articulate responsibility for 
the Other.  
 This gesture also situates Dorothy as the Other who is also the neighbour. By 
expressing solidarity with Solomon in this fashion, she in effect incarnates the 
otherness he had previously represented. It is significant that she uses her jacket to 
wipe the car clean, as a symbol of the distance and sense of dignity as decorum that 
informed her relationship with Solomon; her concern for appearances becomes an 
expression of the proximity of the Other—and thus a recognition of their dignity. As 
with the earlier encounter, however, this proximity with the Other cannot be fully 
tolerated by Dorothy. She leaves the cul-de-sac to visit her parents’ graves, where her 
attempts to reconcile her conflicting feelings about Solomon result in a form of 
psychic split in which she imagines a conversation with her dead parents: 
After a while Mum starts to cry and she asks me what it was about Solomon that 
made me want to be seen with him. I think for a while, and I then tell her that there 
was nothing in particular, it was just that Solomon was a proper gentleman. […] 
[Mum’s] so upset that she can hardly get the words out. Didn’t I understand what 
people would say about me if I were to be seen with a coloured, and particularly one 
as dark as Solomon? (64). 
 
From its beginning Dorothy’s relationship with Solomon has been founded on a 
tension between a sense of affinity and a half-acknowledged sexual attraction. She 
acknowledges that Solomon is “a handsome man, which makes me uncomfortable” 
(16); the anxiety provoked by the possibility of an inter-racial relationship, coupled 
with the proximity of her gesture of sympathy, make the splitting of her Self the only 
way Dorothy can acknowledge that, “Solomon was a man who could have made me 
happy” (65). These conflicting feelings demonstrate the complexity of working out 
the relation of proximity in Levinas’s idea of the other as the neighbour. Solomon’s 
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otherness draws Dorothy to him, and to an awareness of her own otherness, but also 
provokes anxiety. As she returns home this internal crisis is externalised in another 
encounter with a group of homeless people. Dorothy sublimates her own inner-
contradictions by recourse to racial stereotyping—one of the group “looks and sounds 
like a gypsy, with her black hair, and her black eyes, and her grimy black hands” 
(65)—as her contempt for the undignified bare life which she perceives in them turns 
into violence: 
[W]hen she spits in my direction I feel my blood beginning to boil. It’s awkward, for 
I’m not dressed how I want to be dressed. There isn’t much dignity to a crumpled 
jacket, but I’m not going to let this stop me from speaking my mind. But I don’t 
know what to say (66). 
 
Even as she attacks the homeless woman, Dorothy is preoccupied with her 
appearance, with the indignity of her clothing (unaware of the indignity of her 
actions). In spite of her racial anxieties, the jacket which she used to clean Solomon’s 
car remains for her a symbol of (limited) dignity, demonstrating how Phillips’s 
engagement with dignity at the limit is also an engagement with what puts limits on 
dignity. 
Non-place 
The second section of the novel deals with Gabriel’s journey from an unnamed 
African country to England, in which Phillips further engages with the forces that 
place limits on the dignity of the migrant. In examining this, I will refer to Agamben’s 
discussion of the camp, and also to Marc Augé’s idea of “non-place”—space which 
“cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned with identity” (48)iv—in 
order to better understand Phillips’s presentation of dignity at the limits. 
 The notion that drives many of the migrants Gabriel travels with is their idea 
of England as a place of refuge; one of these migrants, Bright, declares that, “I am an 
Englishman. Only the white man respects us, for we do not respect ourselves. If you 
 14
cut my heart open you will find it stamped with the word ‘England’. I speak the 
language, therefore I am going to England to claim my house and my stipend” (134). 
The idea of England, however, is contradictory. Said, with whom Gabriel shares a 
prison cell, asserts, “in England freedom is everything. They can change the law, but 
you cannot change the culture” (78). Despite his conviction in the power of English 
justice, Said’s incarceration demonstrates that he actually represents a species of bare 
life, a fact confirmed by the manner in which his death in the cell is received: 
“Gabriel […] turns to face the warder. ‘He’s been gone for some time.’ The night 
warder looks shocked, but the doctor is ready to leave. ‘I suppose we’ve got some 
paperwork to sort out, right?’” (81. My italics). As with Solomon, Said’s death is 
proof of his condition as homo sacer, one whose death is of no consequence. When 
the Other is made a homo sacer, no trace of proximity or responsibility is recognised 
in their face, or acknowledged beyond the most basic bureaucratic duty. Furthermore, 
Said’s conviction that the law represents an exception to the English culture of 
hospitality and freedom illustrates how the homo sacer is subject to the sovereign 
decision—as Agamben has said, “the production of a biopolitical body is the original 
activity of sovereign power” (6).  
In A Distant Shore the idea of England as it is articulated by migrants is 
presented as a non-place; Augé uses the example of “Albanians camp[ed] in Italy 
dreaming of America” to illustrate how “certain places exist only through the words 
that evoke them, and in this sense are non-places” (95, 94). Similarly, Bright, Said 
and Gabriel’s dream of “England”, constructed around the resonance of the word and 
its residual value as a signifier of past colonial values, is revealed as false, as a non-
place, by their actual experiences in an England that is itself subject to “(t)he cultural 
disorientation that accompanies the collapse of imperial certainties” (Gilroy, 125). 
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Bright and Gabriel initially find shelter in a derelict house, prompting Gabriel’s 
astonishment: “England was not enduring a period of war, so why would somebody 
flee from a grand house like this?” (160). They encounter a place hostile to strangers, 
where alienation is endemic: “To Gabriel’s eyes, English people look unhappy, and he 
notices that they walk with their heads down as though determined to avoid one 
another” (163). It is not the place they anticipated arriving in: “This is not the England 
that he thought he was travelling to, and these shipwrecked people are not the people 
that he imagined he would discover” (176). 
The journey which takes Gabriel to England seems to move through a series of 
anonymous, non-relational non-places, in which his identity is gradually effaced. At 
no point does Phillips give an indication of where the migrants are, or where they 
enter Europe, compounding the sense of anonymity. This is further illustrated by their 
methods of travel. While looking for a way to cross the Channel into England, several 
migrants jump from a bridge on to the roof of a passing train; although Gabriel 
refuses this as too dangerous, he nonetheless elects to take an equally hazardous trip 
clinging to a ledge on the side of a ship. It is interesting to note that both trains and, 
especially, ships are identified by Michel Foucault as examples of what he calls 
heterotopias, “counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real 
sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously 
represented, contested, and inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places” (np). 
Amongst their other functions, heterotopias describe a set of relations, even if what 
they expose are “all the sites inside of which human life is partitioned”. Significantly, 
Augé has described heterotopias as a species of non-place (112). He declares that, 
“non-place designates […] spaces formed in relation to certain ends (transport, transit, 
commerce, leisure), and the relations that individuals have with these spaces” (94). By 
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having Gabriel cross the Channel clinging to the outside ledge of a ship, literally at 
the limit of or margins of the ship (which is, in Foucault’s words, “the heterotopia par 
excellence”), Phillips illustrates how, in the case of irregular migrants, the relation 
described or designated by the non-place is fundamentally one at the limit; bare life at 
its extremity. 
Both the criminalisation Gabriel is subjected to in England (as a result of 
allegations that he abused a girl who helped him, a charge he denies) and his 
experience of the refugee camp in Northern France (unnamed, but almost certainly 
based on the Red Cross Refugee camp at Sangatte, given that Phillips smuggled 
himself into Sangatte in 2001 in order to write an article for The Guardian) 
demonstrate that “the camp”, as a signifier of biopolitical reality, is active in the 
arranging of irregular migrants as the materialisation of bare life. Agamben defines 
the camp as “the pure, absolute, and impassable biopolitical space” (Homo Sacer: 
123) whose influence is the creation of bare life. He also calls it a “dislocating 
localization” (175), a description that is founded on multiple paradoxes. The camp 
represents a permanent space dedicated to the impermanence of its inhabitants; a 
place where the rule of law is defined by its suspension; where those who don’t 
belong are accommodated. It is an expression of the capacity of the political border to 
reproduce itself. As the disorderly presence of the Other is contained by the camp, the 
orderly continuity of the nation is maintained, defining therefore the limits of the 
nation. Consequently, as we identify the influence of the camp as placing irregular 
migrants at the limits of the nation, we can see how A Distant Shore also describes 
how the Other is appropriated by the sovereign powers to define the limits of their 
own influence—making the Other into a limit or boundary, against which they define 
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themselves. Thus Phillips can be said to be tracing what places limitations on dignity, 
and also taking the measure of existence at “the limit”.  
This can be observed in Phillips’s own act of smuggling himself into the 
Sangatte camp, as an exploration of the limitations of gestures of sympathy. Phillips 
states that, because “journalists are not permitted to enter the camp, […] I try to affect 
the demeanour of a resident” (The Guardian, np). In doing so, he is able to bluff his 
way in, placing himself, however briefly, in the place of the other (as the Other), a 
similar gesture to that which Dorothy (belatedly) makes when she cleans Solomon’s 
car. Both are an attempt to bear witness to the effaced condition of the Other; yet as 
such, the limits of such a gesture are immediately apparent. As Primo Levi has 
acknowledged, witnessing is an inevitably limited activity; for Levi, “the survivors 
[…] are not the true witnesses” (63). Building upon this, Agamben notes that 
testimony “contains a lacuna” (Remnants of Auschwitz: 33):  
The value of testimony lies essentially in what it lacks; at its centre it contains 
something that cannot be borne witness to. The ‘true’ witnesses, the ‘complete 
witnesses’, are those who did not bear witness and could not bear witness (34).  
 
By engaging with those who exist at the limit (as a limit to what is considered human 
and inhuman) Phillips inevitably comes up against the limits of his own capacity to 
witness, limited by the paradox that he must “bear witness in the name of the 
impossibility of bearing witness” (34). 
Both Levi and Agamben identify the Muselmann as the complete witness, the 
one who did not survive to bear witness. In the camp jargon of Auschwitz, 
Muselmann referred to those whose extreme degradation had led them to concede 
utterly to the rule of the camp which posited them as inhuman; so called, because they 
shivered in a manner suggestive of muslims at prayer.v It is upon encountering a 
contemporary version of the Muselmann in Sangatte that the limits of Phillips’s 
capacity to bear witness to the camp are most clearly illustrated: 
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In the gloom, an Afghan squats on his haunches and contorts his body into a twisted 
sculpture that describes misery. Cars, many with British plates, flash by, but the man 
does not move a muscle or blink his eyes. (The Guardian, np) 
 
Like the homo sacer, the Muselmann occupies an extreme threshold of distinction 
materialised by the camp; if, as Agamben asserts, “the camp, as the exemplary 
extreme situation, […] allows for the determination of what is human and inhuman”, 
then the Muselmann “marks the threshold between the human and the inhuman. [….] 
There is thus a point at which human beings, while apparently remaining human 
beings, cease to be human. This point is the Muselmann, and the camp is his 
exemplary site” (Remnants of Auschwitz: 48, 55). The Afghan Muselmann, utterly 
passive to the inertia of his predicament, silently articulates the political subjugation 
of the migrant as “the limit-figure of the human and the inhuman” (Mills, np); 
conversely, Phillips’s position as witness is limited by the fact that he is not, in this 
instance, subject to the limitations of the camp. The Muselmann’s silence imposes a 
corresponding silence on Phillips. The article concludes with Phillips looking on at 
“the stream of hunch-shouldered refugees walking with grim determination in the 
direction of the mouth of the tunnel. And I silently wish them all good luck” (The 
Guardian, np). His silence acknowledges the limitations of his testimony; that which 
limits participation in the new world order, Phillips suggests, is endemic, 
consolidating his prediction of a single “global conversation with limited participation 
open to all, and full participation available to none” (A New World Order: 5).  Yet, in 
attempting to make such a gesture, he also suggests that it is by approaching and 
engaging with these limits that a greater (if partial) understanding of the terms of the 
conversation will be achieved.  
A Distant Shore is a powerful examination of the situation of the irregular 
migrant in the new world order, made all the more so by its “powerful uncertainty” 
(Scott, 169). Even where the novel shows gestures of seemingly extraordinary 
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hospitality—the Andersons who take Gabriel into their home—in virtually every case, 
Phillips also shows us their limits, such as Mike’s expressions of racial prejudice 
(290-291). In spite of this it remains a novel that is ultimately committed to the notion 
that it is at the limits that we can encounter “the dignity which informs the limited 
participation of the migrant”, and also committed to the idea of the Other as the 
neighbour, and the responsibilities this entails; a sentiment articulated by Solomon, 
when he is offered the job as night-watchman in Stoneleigh: 
The house in which I live is at the far end of the street, and it is smaller than the other 
houses. […] I am familiar with this village, and this area, but now it is to be my 
home. I am to be the night-watchman, and my job will be to watch over these people 
(280). 
 
                                                 
i Gabriel, who takes the name Solomon Bartholomew, represents one of the many migrants to the UK 
who feel their only option is to remove themselves from the processes of legitimisation which place on 
them a burden of proof beyond their capacity to provide. This is illustrated in the exchange between 
Gabriel and his legal advisors, one of whom argues, “I’m only trying to establish dates, not state of 
mind” (113).  
ii Agamben has asserted, “if the camp consists in the materialisation of the state of exception and in the 
subsequent creation of a space in which bare life and the juridical rule enter into a threshold of 
indistinction, then we must admit that we find ourselves virtually in the presence of the camp every 
time such a structure is created” (Homo Sacer: 174). 
iii See also Levinas, Emmanuel. Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. 
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981 [1974], 12. 
iv It is significant that Agamben has called the camp a “non-place” (Remnants of Auschwitz: 48). 
v Agamben notes that the most likely inspiration for the phrase was in the literal meaning of “muslim” 
in Arabic, i.e. the one who submits unconditionally to the will of God. (45) 
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